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Abstract: In the 16th and 17th centuries, the conceptual significance of “imagination” 
was indebted primarily to Aristotle’s theory of the phantasia, translated as imaginatio 
and thoroughly discussed in treatises on poetry, rhetoric and philosophy. In this text, 
I intend to briefly explore some ideas concerning the historical specificity of the notion 
of “imagination” in Renaissance poetics, attempting to avoid a transhistorical approach 
to the study of poetry and its interpretation. In order to do this, I will present specific 
passages from Philip Sidney’s The Defense of Poetry (1595), Francis Bacon’s The Advancement 
of Learning (1605) and Shakespeare’s works.
Keywords: Imagination; Renaissance Poetics; Phantasia. 
Resumo: Nos séculos XVI e XVII, o significado conceitual de “imaginação” atrelava-
se sobretudo à teoria aristotélica da phantasia, traduzida como imaginatio, em latim, 
e amplamente discutida em tratados sobre poesia e retórica. Neste artigo, propõe-se 
explorar brevemente algumas ideias relativas à especificidade histórica da noção de 
“imaginação” na poética renascentista, com vistas a evitar as abordagens transistóricas 
da poesia e de sua interpretação. Para tanto, serão comentados trechos específicos dos 
tratados The Defense of Poetry (1595), de Philip Sidney, Advancement of Learning (1605), de 
Francis Bacon, bem como algumas passagens das obras de William Shakespeare.
Palavras-chave: Imaginação; Poética renascentista; Phantasia. 
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Images appear to us even when our eyes are shut.
Aristotle, De anima.
[...] my soul’s imaginary sight
Presents thy shadow to my sightless view.
Shakespeare, Sonnet 27
When, by the mid-18th century, a series of social and political transfor-
mations dismantle the rigid order of the Absolutist regimes throughout 
Europe, the discipline of Rhetoric - until then the master doctrine of 
symbolic representations - is broken down and torn apart from other 
disciplines which had been historically attached to it, as Poetics, Ethics 
and Logic (Cf. VICKERS, 1990; MACK, 2011)1. As Rhetoric came to be seen 
as an instrument of persuasion typical of the tumbling aristocratic so-
cial order and its discourses, the appeal it once had as a formative force 
upon literary compositions back in the age of Shakespeare, Donne and 
Milton, for example, lost much of its power for the new generations of 
artists who strove to introduce fresh conceptualizations of the arts and 
its domain of creation and aesthetic function. At the same time, the no-
tion of “imagination” came to be defined as a core foundational source 
of poetic composition at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, in an 
artistic and scholarly milieu which strove to reject the traditional pre-
cepts of Rhetoric, challenging and reconstruing the previous conceptu-
al significance of “imagination” - which had been indebted primarily to 
Aristotle’s theory of the phantasia, translated as imaginatio in Latin by 
Italian scholars mainly since the 15th century. In this text, I intend to 
briefly explore some ideas concerning the historical specificity of the 
notion of “imagination” in 16th and 17th century poetics, in an attempt 
to emphasize the importance of avoiding a transhistorical approach to 
the study of poetry and its foundational categories of analysis and in-
terpretation. 
1  For further discussion on this topic, see particularly Vickers (1990, p. 715), where he discusses the 
isolation of critical terms (rhetoric, poetics, ethic and so on) as “a product of post-Romantic literary 
theory, deriving from a period in which traditional rhetoric had been banished from education”. The 
present paper on Renaissance poetics and the notion of imagination was originally conceived for oral 
presentation, and intends to offer only a more schematic view of such a complex topic; for further 
comparative work on the imagination in the Renaissance and in Romantic poetics, a good place to start 
is Jonathan Bate (1989), particularly the first chapter - “Shakespeare, Imagination, Romanticism”. 
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“A certain coloring of imagination”
The dismantling of Rhetoric as the main doctrinal source for the artis-
tic composition in different genres was both a constituent part and a 
final result of the Enlightenment and Romantic projects which, in their 
versatile diversity, designed to unify the artistic experiences under 
a common creative power involving the imagination (Cf. BATE, 1989; 
KLEIN, 1996). In lieu of the ancient rhetorical categories that provided 
a distinctive method (or techné) for the artistic composition in each se-
parate genre - say, the Lyric, the Epic, the Tragic, and so on -, these 
new projects aimed at merging the artistic expressions into the more 
unified realm of a dynamic creative imagination which was generally 
connected to an individualized process of conception metaphorized in 
the ethos of the “gifted artist”. The idea became crystallized in seve-
ral poetic propositions, such as in the famous image conceived by John 
Keats: “My imagination is a monastery, and I am its monk” (KEATS, 
2011 [1820], p. 464). This rather verticalized idea of an inner expression 
which inhabits the realm of the creative imagination came to replace 
the more structural and rhetorically based prescriptive foundation for 
the artistic representations seen as external objects embodied by and 
through the notion of tradition (consuetudo). 
In his preface to the Lyrical Ballads (1798), William Wordsworth 
argued that poets needed to free themselves from conventional modes 
of artistic expression in order to let the fresh “poetry of nature” emerge; 
employing the metaphor of “friendship” to convey this idea, he wrote: 
“the power of any art is limited; and he will suspect that if I propose 
to furnish him with new friends it is only upon condition of his aban-
doning his old friends” (WORDSWORTH, 2003 [1798], p. 24). Thus, by 
proposing to abandon the “old friends” poets had for centuries turned 
to for the composition of their verses, Wordsworth is notwithstanding 
introducing specific poetic forms and ideas which poets were to follow, 
building up what would become the new conventions of the Romantic 
verse; indeed, one could even think here of an allegory where Rhetoric 
could emerge as one of the “old friends” Wordsworth is attempting to 
reject. In an emblematic passage of his Preface, Wordsworth spells out 
the procedure which was employed to compose the poems of Lyrical 
Ballads: “to choose incidents and situations from common life, and to 
relate or describe them, throughout, as far as was possible in a selec-
tion of language really used by men, and, at the same time, to throw 
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over them a certain colouring of imagination” (WORDSWORTH, 2003 
[1798], p.7). This precept for the poetic expression, in which natural 
speech is seen as an empirical given to be extracted from a likewise 
empirical “common life” and only then subjected to “a certain color-
ing of imagination”, is in itself a strong rejection of the rhetorical “old 
friend” that had for centuries prescribed a conventional selection of 
specific topics of invention for the poetic composition, where the “inci-
dents and situations” were to be extracted not directly from empirical 
experience - which was considered to be accidental and transitory -, 
but from the traditional modes of representing them, by emulating and 
thus renovating previous literary models elected as the best examples 
for each genre. 
In the 16th and 17th centuries, the widespread definition of po-
etry and, indeed, of every artistic creation was strongly rooted upon 
several Aristotelian premises found not only in his Art of Poetry, but 
first and foremost in the treatises that constituted the basic doctrinal 
knowledge taught in the grammar schools and universities through-
out the European courts - mainly The Art of Rhetoric, the Organon, De 
Anima and The Nicomachean Ethics (VICKERS, 1990; BALDWIN, 1944; 
MACK, 2011). Throughout the 16th century, new Latin editions of Ar-
istotle’s treatises were been put into print, enlarging, challenging and 
sometimes subverting the previous Medieval and Scholastic readings 
of the Aristotelian principles. New annotated editions, with commen-
taries by contemporary scholars, poets and rhetoricians from different 
European courts and religious background circulated widely, shaping 
and influencing Renaissance vernacular poetics2. In The Defense of Poetry 
(1595), the celebrated English poet Philip Sidney advanced the follow-
ing encapsulated definition: “Poesy therefore is an art of imitation, for 
so Aristotle terms it in his word mimesis, that is to say, a representing, 
counterfeiting, or figuring forth - to speak metaphorically, a speaking 
picture - with this end: to teach and delight” (SIDNEY, 2002 [1595], p. 
2  A good example of the wide circulation of the new Latin editions of Aristotle’s treatises is Ermolao 
Barbaro’s annotated translation of The Art of Rhetoric (1547); it is possible today to consult the copies 
of Ermolao’s translation owned by Spanish poet Francisco de Quevedo and that owned by the English 
scholar and poet Gabriel Harvey at the same period of time. Both copies are extensively annotated with 
marginalia by their owners, with references to contemporary poetry and writers, and their reflections 
upon the different aspects of Aristotelian rhetoric. For further on this, see Luisa Lopez-Grigera. Anotacio-
nes de Quevedo a la Retórica de Aristóteles. Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1998; and G.C. Moore 
Smith. Gabriel Harvey’s Marginalia. Stratford-upon-Avon: Shakespeare Head Press, 1913. 
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217). The notion of poetry as a “speaking picture” - attributed by Plu-
tarch in his Moralia to poet Simonides of Ceos - became a commonplace 
employed throughout the 16th century, appearing in sonnets, plays, 
emblems and other genres. The reference behind this metaphor was 
mainly the Aristotelian notion of the eikonopoiós, that is, of the poet as 
a “maker of images” (Art of Poetry, 1995, 1460b9), but the foundational 
force that supported the idea came from the widely discussed Aristote-
lian propositions about the functionings of the mind (the complex doc-
trine of the organic soul), on one hand, and the conventions of rhetori-
cal composition, on the other. Through the poetic expression, images of 
a fictional world emerge as a second nature mediated and sustained by 
the force of verisimilitude - a key constituent of the Aristotelian doc-
trine of mimesis3. Belonging to the world of symbolic representation, 
poetry may embody even the most fantastical images as long as it is reg-
ulated by decorum and verisimilitude, variating according to the fitness 
of each genre: employing, for instance, the most lascivious language in 
the erotic elegy, the histrionic expression of comedy, or the circum-
spect tone in the religious sonnet. Being ruled by verisimilitude, poetry 
is a “counterfeiting” art, and has no immediate claim to truthfulness: in 
a celebrated passage of his treatise on poetry, Philip Sidney insightfully 
affirms that poets can never lie. That is because, he argues, poets never 
intended to be speaking the truth in the first place:
Now for the poet, he nothing affirms, and therefore never lies. 
For, as I take it, to lie is to affirm that to be true which is false; 
so as to the other artists, and especially the historian, affirming 
many things, can, in the cloudy knowledge of mankind, hardly 
escape from many lies. But the poet, as I said before, never affir-
ms. The poet never makes any circles about your imagination, 
to conjure you to believe for true what he writes. (SIDNEY, 2002 
[1595], p. 235)
3  Though the Aristotelian doctrine of mimesis and its focus on verisimilitude constituted the mains-
tream precept guiding the composition of poetry in the European Renaissance, diverse authors based 
themselves on the Platonic concept then known as the furor poeticus - as expounded in Plato’s Ion, 
Republic and Phaedrus, among others - to challenge the idea that poetry should be imitative and 
verisimilar. For Patrizi da Cherso, in his Discorso della diversità dei furori poetici (1553), for instance, 
poets should aim not at what appears to be credible or plausible, but at the marvellous (maraviglioso) 
attainable only through incredible images and inventions. For further discussion on this, see Vickers 
(1990), p. 738-740. 
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Concluding his argument with a clear-cut example, Sidney sardoni-
cally transfers the fault of indiscretion - in the sense of not being able to 
discern what is true and what is false - to the ignorant reader: “so think I 
none so simple would say that Aesop lied in the tales of his beasts; for who 
thinks Aesop writ it for actually true were well worthy to have his name 
chronicled among the beasts he writes of” (SIDNEY, 2002 [1595], p. 235). 
Frontispiece of the 1595 edition of Philip Sidney’s The Defense of Poetry
“High and vaporous imaginations”
This perspective of poetry as a feigning or counterfeiting art belonging to 
the hypothetical realm of fantasy is anchored in yet another key Aristote-
lian notion: that of the phantasia - translated more systematically by Italian 
scholars from the 15th century onwards as imaginatio, in Latin -, unders-
tood as an innate faculty essentially independent (but not disconnected) 
from the sphere of judgement. In his treatise De anima (Peri Psyches), Aristo-
tle distinguishes the intellective process which discriminates what is true 
and what is false, or what is right and what is wrong, from the psychic 
power of imagining hypothetical forms, ideas, situations and actions that 
appear as visions (phantasmata) in “the mind’s eye” - the inner faculty of 
imagination: “images appear to us even when our eyes are shut. Neither is 
imagination any of the things that are never in error, as knowledge or in-
telligence; for imagination may be false” (ARISTOTLE, 1984, 428a15). On the 
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other hand, without these visions which are triggered by perception and 
sensorial experience, as well as by processes of reminiscence and absorbed 
by the imaginative faculty, no reasoning would be possible, since “the soul 
never thinks without a mental picture” (ARISTOTLE, 1984, 432a). A key ele-
ment in the Aristotelian theory of acquiring and producing knowledge, the 
faculty of the imagination is the very bridge which connects perception 
and thought; as Frances Yates summarizes: 
The perceptions brought in by the five senses are first treated or 
worked upon by the faculty of imagination, and it is the images 
so formed which become the material of the intellectual faculty. 
Imagination is the intermediary between perception and thought. 
Thus while all knowledge is ultimately derived from sense impres-
sions it is not on these in the raw that thought works but after they 
have been treated by, or absorbed into, the imaginative faculty. It 
is the image-making part of the soul which makes the work of the 
higher processes of thought possible. (YATES, 1966, p. 32)
This notion of the works of the imagination as not necessarily or 
primarily bound to truthfulness or empirical reality underpins the very 
concept of artistic productions and the creative process, particularly in 
the definitions of poetry and its functions4. In his treatise The Advance-
ment of Learning (1605), Francis Bacon takes up a discussion of how the 
different learning processes occur in the human mind, attributing his-
tory to memory, poetry to imagination and philosophy to reason. He 
defines poetry in the following terms: 
Poesy is a part of learning in the measure of words, for the most 
part restrained, but in all other points extremely licensed, and 
doth truly refer to the imagination; which, being not tied to the 
laws of matter, may at pleasure join that which nature hath seve-
red, and sever that which nature hath joined, and so make unla-
wful matches and divorces of things. (BACON, 2010 [1605], p. 135) 
4  Murray W. Bundy is very assertive as to the significance of the Aristotelian doctrine of phantasia 
for Renaissance poetics: “Aristotle’s De Anima [...] may become more significant for literary criticism 
than the Poetics” (Bundy, 1930, p. 536). It is a strong foundation of Early Modern ideas on psycholo-
gical functionings, including the creative process; Cf. Kessler, 1990, p. 485: “Aristotle’s teaching on 
the intellective soul (De Anima III.4-5) serves as the starting point for Renaissance discussions and, 
therefore, predetermines the questions raised and the answers given”.
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The faculty of the imagination allowed for the conceiving of images 
which might be insightful illusions, rightfully belonging to the realm of the 
hypothetical - “unlawful matches” and “divorce of things” not primarily 
or essentially connected to truth, judgment, opinion, discretion, prudence. 
Frontispiece of Francis Bacon’s Of the Advancement and Proficience of Learning (1605)
Specifically, imagination was understood as one of the internal 
perceptual faculties located in the sensitive soul, not in the intellective 
soul - where the faculties of the intellect and the will would then process 
the images formed in the mind’s eye. This creative capacity of imagina-
tion intensifies the psychic power of being able to continually visualize 
and feel the forms and emotions which are not immediately present to 
the external senses. In De Anima, Aristotle develops this idea of the abil-
ity to see things even with eyes closed - being awake or dreaming. It is a 
way of activating reminiscence, but of transcending it as well, through 
the creative contours given to recollected forms, emotions and ideas. 
Such a topic was thoroughly explored in lyric poetry throughout the 
Renaissance, and gave a doctrinal basis to many poetic images of love 
and longing. In Sonnet 27, Shakespeare takes up the imagery of a men-
tal journey which is able to materialize, through the faculty of imagina-
tion, the absent body of the persona’s lover during a dream: 
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Weary with toil, I haste me to my bed,
The dear repose for limbs with travel tired;
But then begins a journey in my head,
To work my mind, when body’s work’s expired: 
For then my thoughts, from far where I abide,
Intend a zealous pilgrimage to thee,
And keep my drooping eyelids open wide,
Looking on darkness which the blind do see:
Save that my soul’s imaginary sight
Presents thy shadow to my sightless view,
Which, like a jewel hung in ghastly night,
Makes black night beauteous and her old face new. 
Lo! thus, by day my limbs, by night my mind, 
For thee and for myself no quiet find.
(SHAKESPEARE, 1975 [1609], p. 1195) 
 
The “imaginary sight” of the mind’s eye is able to recreate in absence 
the forms and objects which the external senses had absorbed in experience, 
stirring new modes of emotion and animating what an otherwise “ghastly 
night” would relentless offer as a vacuous deprivation of love and comfort. 
Imagination, in Shakespeare’s sonnet, becomes the very “darkness which the 
blind do see”: the perceptual faculty which exists only in “sightless view”, but 
that nonetheless is able to rekindle and awaken the absent objects of desire. 
Frontispiece of Shakespeare’s Sonnets (1609) 
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Throughout the Renaissance, it was a commonplace to refer to 
imagination as one of the “five inner wits” - usually listed as common 
sense, imagination, fantasy, estimation, and memory - which correspond-
ed to the five external senses: vision, hearing, smell, taste and touch (PARK, 
1990). As an inner wit, imagination gives rational beings the power to pic-
ture sensations, external forms and ideas which may be beautiful or mon-
strous, good or evil, holy or obscene - the vast array of possible visualiza-
tions which spring up from the human faculty of imagination, categorized 
and discussed in terms of “icastic” and “fantastic” images. This recurring 
distinction of the poetic image in the Renaissance appropriated Plato’s use 
of the terms eikastiké (imitative) and phantastiké (fanciful, imaginary) in the 
Sophist in order to distinguish between good and harmful artistic compo-
sitions (Cf. VICKERS, 2003, p. 371). Philip Sidney summarizes the distinc-
tion as follows: “I will not deny but that man’s wit may make poesy, which 
should be eikastiké - which some learned have defined: figuring forth good 
things -, to be phantastiké - which doth, contrariwise, infect the fancy with 
unworthy objects (SIDNEY, 2002, p. 236). However, the contrast between 
these two types of poetic image more commonly develops into a discussion 
of decorum - the aptness and propriety involving the invention and em-
ployment of ideas in poetry, as propounded by Horace, for instance - and 
not into an ethical restriction concerning the truthfulness or not of poetry. 
Furthermore, poetical images were bound by the precepts of mi-
mesis to work through verisimilitude in order to be translatable, as it 
were, from the nascent spring of imagination to the comprehensible 
channels of speech as conceived and codified by Rhetorical invention. 
This is a journey from the particular to the collective domain of artis-
tic creation understood as such only after the individual works of the 
imagination become artfully translated into poetic language - which is 
the domain of tradition. This operation can be perceived, for instance, in 
the famous image of Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream (c. 1595):
The poet’s eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,  
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven;  
As imagination bodies forth  
The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen  
Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing  
A local habitation and a name. 
(SHAKESPEARE, 1975 [1623], V.1.7-12) 
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The process of poetic composition based upon the mimetic conven-
tions cannot be a direct expression of the imagination - of the illusional 
realm of visions and “things unknown” - without the work of the instru-
mental pen, which translates into the collective domain of a shared tradi-
tion what was latent in the individual mind as an “airy nothing”: a form 
without conventional shape in the subjective perception. Likewise, Francis 
Bacon identifies the necessary and laborious process of transforming what 
appears in the faculty of imagination into something capable of being ex-
pressed: “So whosoever shall entertain high and vaporous imaginations, 
instead of a laborious and sober inquiry of truth, shall beget hopes and 
beliefs of strange and impossible shapes” (BACON, 2010 [1605], p. 163). It 
could indeed be argued that the faculty of the imagination by itself was not 
understood in Renaissance poetics - at least not in a predominant mode - as 
a sovereign, independent and creative potentiality able to produce poetic 
truthfulness without the aid of judgment, reason and discretion. Philip Sid-
ney, in his treatise, emphasizes both the fictional realm of poetry and its 
dependence on the numerous precepts guiding the “profitable” poetic in-
vention, which involves the imagination but is not a direct expression of it: 
If then a man can arrive to that child’s age, to know that the 
poets’ persons and doings are but pictures what should be, and 
not stories what have been, they will never give the lie to things 
not affirmatively but allegorically and figuratively written. And 
therefore, as in history looking for truth, they may go away full 
fraught with falsehood, so in poesy looking but for fiction, they 
shall use the narration but as an imaginative ground-plot of a 
profitable invention. (SIDNEY, 2002 [1595], p. 235) 
Sidney’s notion of an “imaginative ground-plot”, just as in Shake-
speare’s image of the “airy nothing” and Francis Bacon’s reference to 
“vaporous imaginations”, develops the idea that the visions ignited by 
imaginative processes in the mind’s eye - that which Aristotle calls phan-
tasmata - could only be materialized in the artistic production after be-
ing transformed into that which possessed the qualities of a “profitable 
invention”. Thus, even when writers stress the fundamental relevance of 
imagination in the creative process, they are not claiming that poetry - or 
any of the mimetic arts, for that matter - could ever be a direct expres-
sion of this perceptual faculty of the sensitive (not intellective) soul. 
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In contrast, in the historical context of the turn of the 18th to 
the 19th century, the fresh theorizations on the aesthetic experience 
driven by the works of Kant, Schiller, Friedrich Schlegel and others set 
forth a new perception of the foundations of artistic production and the 
place of the individual artist in relation to the poetic creation (BATE, 
1989). In his essay A Defense of Poetry (1821), Percy B. Shelley introduces 
this celebrated definition: 
Poetry, in a general sense, may be defined to be “the expres-
sion of the imagination”: and poetry is connate with the origin 
of man. Man is an instrument over which a series of external 
and internal impressions are driven, like the alternations of an 
ever-changing wind over an Æolian lyre, which move it by their 
motion to ever-changing melody. (SHELLEY, 2006 [1821], p. 2) 
The Romantic stress on sensorial “impressions” processed 
through the creative imagination was at the same time influenced by 
and influential in the contemporary theorization of a subjective indi-
viduality which is conceived as aware of the historicity of human ex-
perience, even when affirming its transcendence. In this context, the 
faculty of the imagination is affirmed as a sovereign potentiality able 
to process the versatile experiences of perception, transforming them 
into a possible image of poetic truthfulness: “to be a poet is to appre-
hend the true and the beautiful, in a word, the good which exists in 
the relation, subsisting, first between existence and perception, and 
secondly between perception and expression” (SHELLEY, 2006 [1821], 
p.4). The agency of imagination in the creative process became a wide-
spread notion in the Romantic discourses on poetry, advancing a new 
perspective on the artistic productions to some extent still powerful 
today - including how one reads and absorbs the notion of imagination 
in poetry. In his meditative essay Biographia Literaria (1817), Coleridge 
defines the imagination primarily as “the living power and prime agent 
of all human perception, and is a repetition in the finite mind of the 
eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM” (COLERIDGE, 1996 [1817], 
p.750). In this proposition, Coleridge affirms, at the same time, the his-
toricity and the transcendence of the subjective “I am”, able to infi-
nitely reduplicate an ever-moving creative process which is imprinted 
in the individual faculty of imagination. Different from the Aristotelian 
Letras, Santa Maria, Especial, n. 1, p. 33-47, 2019
45
My soul’s 
imaginary 
sight
notion of phantasia, which, as we have seen, was bound to the realm of 
hypothetical conjectures not necessarily connected to truthfulness, the 
Romantic proposition sees imagination as the very agent that brings 
together, discriminates and transforms into poetic truth what had been 
scattered in the spheres of physical and sensorial impressions. As John 
Keats insightfully affirms: “I am certain of nothing but the holiness of 
the Heart’s affections and the truth of Imagination. What the imagina-
tion seizes as Beauty must be truth - whether it existed before or not” 
(KEATS, 2009 [1820], p. 480). In different historical periods, the creative 
process behind the poetic composition is understood and defined in dis-
tinctive particular forms, depending on variant, profound conceptions 
of the human faculties, senses and perceptions, including imagination. 
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